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Abstract—Seismic events can cause devastating impacts on 
both overground and underground energy system 
infrastructure. This paper proposes a methodology to evaluate 
the impact of seismic events on the security of integrated 
electricity and gas system, mainly focusing on pipelines leakage 
and connection loss of electricity transmission lines. A stochastic 
model is used to formulate the damage level based on 
earthquake severity. The seismic impact on the integrated 
system is classified according to the levels of pipe leak and 
electricity line failure. Load curtailment due to limited 
generation capacity and overloaded transmission lines is 
thereafter quantified. Seismic intensity is generated randomly 
based on Monte Carlo simulation so that a certain seismic 
intensity can be related to relevant load curtailment. An 
integrated energy system with a 30-busbar electricity system 
and a 6-node natural gas network is used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. The results clearly 
illustrate damage consequences under seismic events in terms of 
both probability and severity levels. This work can inform 
resilience enhancement scheme design based on the 
vulnerability performance and impact of both systems. 
 
Index terms—Integrated electricity and gas system, Pipe leak, 
Seismic damage, transmission line outage. 
 
 NOMENCLATURE 
 
𝑃𝐺𝑉 Peak ground velocity. 
𝑃𝐺𝐴 Peak ground acceleration. 
𝐺 Admittance matrix of gas pipes. 
𝐴 Connection matrix of the system. 
𝑃 Pressure matrix of gas nodes.  
𝑄 Flow rate vector of gas nodes 
𝐸𝑂𝐷 Equivalent orifice diameter 
𝑡  Thickness of maximum possible annular 
space. 
𝑘 Annular disengagement constant of 
damaged pipes. 
𝑘1, 𝑘2 Local crack constant of pipe wall. 
𝜃  Opening angle of damage orifice. 
𝐷 Diameter of the damaged pipe. 
w  Width of split of damaged pipe. 
𝑃𝑖  The probability of i th leak scenarios.  
𝑑𝑖 Equivalent orifice diameter under the i th 
damage scenarios. 
𝐶𝐻𝑃 A Combined Heat and Power plant. 
𝑦 The efficiency of combined heat and power 
plant. 
𝑃𝐺𝐶𝐻𝑃 The power output of CHP. 
𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑠  The gas energy input of CHP. 
𝐶𝐿 Connection loss of the power system under 
seismic stress. 
𝐷 𝐶𝐿 The damage expectation of connection loss. 
𝐶𝐿𝑛 Connection loss of the worst damage state. 
𝑃𝐶𝐿,𝑖 Probability of the i th damage state. 
𝐶𝐿𝑖 Connection loss of the i th damage state. 
𝑆𝐹𝑛 The sensitive factor for branch flow over 
demand change. 
∆𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖 The changes of branch flow. 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 The changes of demand.  
 
Ⅰ.  INTRODUCTION 
HE interconnection of various energy vectors has widely 
grown in recent years, especially between electricity and 
natural gas systems. Many technologies, for instance, 
combined heat and power (CHP) unit, energy hub, and micro-
grid enable the increasing combination of those two energy 
systems. In the meantime, due to the climate change, low 
probability high impact natural events could cause severe 
consequences to the interconnected energy systems. Any 
failure of the interconnections may lead to significant energy 
loss and the impact could propagate to the other networks. 
Therefore, the security of integrated electricity and gas 
system needs to be assessed.  
Due to that seismic activities damage both overground 
and underground parts of energy systems, how integrated 
energy systems would behave and react regarding seismic 
activities should be taken into consideration. From the 
topological point of view, papers [1, 2] quantify the seismic 
impact on integrated electricity and gas systems in terms of 
connectivity loss, power loss and impact factor on affected 
population. Based on that, further research [3] shows that, 
compared to separate electricity and gas networks, the 
interdependency of gas and electricity system shows an 
T 
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increased vulnerability. Consequently, it can be concluded 
that in order to promote system security, the response and 
behaviours of integrated gas and electricity should be 
investigated with high priority. 
Seismic modelling methods can be mainly categorized 
into three groups: direct methods, integral-equation methods, 
and asymptotic methods [4]. The first group refers to the 
mathematical expressions based on a numerical mesh [5-7], 
the second group is related to wave filed that oriented from 
point sources [8, 9] while the last group also considers wave 
filed but only approximates certain magnitude of seismic 
events [10-12]. In this paper, the intensity of seismic activities 
is modelled by wave propagation described as peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) and peak ground velocity (PGV). These 
variables are related to landslides, surface faulting and 
liquefaction-induced lateral spreading [13, 14]. It can be 
obtained that the higher the seismic level, the higher the PGA 
magnitude would be. The relationship between PGA, PGV 
and seismic intensity can be found in [15]. 
 
TABLE Ⅰ 
RANGES OF PGA, PGV AND SEISMIC INTENSITY 
Intensity Ⅰ Ⅱ ~
Ⅲ 
Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ 
PGA 
(%g) 
<0.17 0.17-
1.4 
1.4-
3.9 
3.9-
9.2 
9.2-
18 
18-
34 
34-
65 
65-
124 
PGV 
(cm/s) 
<0.1 0.1-
1.1 
1.1-
3.4 
3.4-
8.1 
8.1-
16 
16-
31 
31-
60 
60-
116 
  
For typical gas networks, seismic activities mainly affect 
pipelines by causing gas leakage. This type of damage may 
not directly lead to destructions but would cause energy 
supply loss of gas generation due to insufficient supply. In 
fact, because of various types of forces, there is a large 
difference between the seismic response of buried pipes and 
above ground infrastructures [13]. In natural gas systems, 
ground movements normally result in pipeline leaks. To 
evaluate the leakage rate, paper [16] defines an equivalent 
diameter 𝜇 to describe gas leakage, which points out that 
general gas leakage usually varies from 0 to 10mm/m. 
Although simplified analysis procedures are analysed, the 
unduly amount of assumptions evolved may lead to 
inaccurate results. Thus, after modifying some assumptions, 
a modified analysed method for buried pipes underground 
motion is presented [17], in which various types of fault 
movements are investigated. Nevertheless, though the 
physical performance of buried pipelines is distinguished, 
how gas leakage can be correlated with seismic intensity is 
still not clear. Paper [18] takes gas supply networks as an 
example and designs a probability density evolution approach 
to evaluate the seismic reliability of networks. However, in 
this model, the connectivity reliability is obtained but ignored 
the gas flow conditions. 
As for electrical systems, seismic activities significantly 
impede the security of generation plants, substations and 
distribution circuits. The destruction of these elements may 
result in a significant load loss [14, 19, 20]. To evaluate the 
regional economic loss of disturbed electricity lifelines, paper 
[6] proposes a seismic performance quantification scheme 
based on a linear programming model. This method enables 
an input-output analysis that can not only validate the 
economic loss but also contribute to loss mitigation. The 
intensity detection of a seismic explosion is realised with the 
air-shock wave impact of drilling and blasting operations on 
electricity power lines in paper [21]. However, more detailed 
considerations of electricity power lines structure, shock 
resistance should be applied regarding the impact of seismic 
explosion loads. In paper [22], the repair costs and system 
downtime are analysed based on MATPOWER. The 
drawback of this model is that only the vulnerability of 
transformers and plants are analysed while system branches 
are ignored. Referring to graph theory, a seismic vulnerability 
assessment strategy for interdependent critical systems is 
developed in paper [3]. The structural vulnerability is 
quantified by evaluating the seismic impact on population 
and energy supply. The shortcoming of this method is that the 
graph theory can only evaluate the structural vulnerability but 
ignores the change of power flows.  
This paper designs a novel method to assess the 
performance of integrated natural gas and electricity systems 
under seismic stress. The connection loss of transmission 
lines and seismic leakage of gas pipelines is extensively 
assessed, where the first task is achieved by building a 
probabilistic model and the second is estimated by modelling 
several damage scenarios. It proposes a novel seismic damage 
quantification method considering both seismic losses caused 
by the lack of generation and demand curtailment while 
meeting network power flow constraints. The vulnerability of 
system branches is thereafter assessed, based on the analysis 
of each branch disconnection impact on load curtailment.  
The main contribution of this paper is;   
• This designed scheme specifies seismic damage by 
investigating the energy flow changes within the entire 
integrated energy system. Then, the seismic impact on 
system components and system functionality are clearly 
described. But existing research mainly concerns with 
connectivity loss based on graph theory and ignores 
damage to system components and functionality, 
• Instead of investigating economic loss by building a 
simplified model for energy systems, this proposed 
scheme relates a certain intensity of seismic activities to 
a certain amount of load loss. Consequently, the damage 
caused by seismic stress is more precisely quantified.  
• The load loss is estimated by decreased generation 
capacity caused by gas leakage and load curtailment 
while meeting transmission line capacity. It allows 
system operators to comprehend how seismic damage 
would affect energy system capability and integrity. In 
addition, it considers the seismic impact on both system 
generation and demand, thus fully examining the 
consequences on the whole supply chain.  
• The weight of branches on system security is assessed 
by using an evaluation method. Based on that, system 
resilience can be enhanced by strengthening the most 
vulnerable branches, thus providing the possibility to 
design system strengthening strategies with lower 
budget but higher efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
investigates the seismic response of the gas network. In 
Section III, the response of electricity systems to seismic 
events is studied and in Section IV, a case study is presented. 
A discussion on substation is introduced in Ⅴ. Section Ⅵ 
concludes this paper. 
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Ⅱ. THE SEISMIC BEHAVIOUR OF GAS NETWORK 
This section investigates the performance of gas 
pipelines under seismic events. A mathematical expression of 
pipe leakage is presented, in which the seismic damage is 
separated into two aspects: the damage quantity and damage 
quality. The first aspect can be related to different seismic 
intensity while the other aspect specifies the leakage rate. 
Consequently, a relationship between the gas leakage rate and 
the seismic intensity is established. 
A. The damage to buried pipelines 
To quantify the seismic loss of gas networks, a 
relationship needs to be established between the seismic 
intensity and overall pipeline leakage. In this paper, for the 
gas networks, the seismic behaviour is classified by three 
steps: Firstly, the seismic intensity is quantified and related to 
certain PGV. Subsequently, equation (1) allows the 
classification of how many damage holes would be generated 
by the seismic stress. Then, the expectation of the size of 
damage holes and how much the gas pressure P would be 
affected can be obtained. Consequently, the loss of flow rate 
Q can be found. In this paper, 5 damage scenarios are 
deployed to estimate the leakage loss. 
To address gas leakage caused by the seismic stress, the 
relationship between the damage quantity, or damage ratio, 
and seismic intensity is classified first. Normally, the damage 
ratio of the gas network can be described by the damage rate, 
which represents the number of damage points per kilometres 
of pipelines within the entire system. According to paper [14], 
for ductile iron, the damage rate is classified by PGV as 
𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
 Damage points
Km
= 0.00003 × (PGV)2.25  (1) 
Thus, the intensity of seismic activities can be related to a 
certain damage ratio of a gas network. 
B. The estimation of leakage amount 
However, although the damage rate for overall pipelines 
is obtained, the gas leakage amount for each damage orifice 
on pipes still need to be investigated. 
For typical seismic activities, the peak horizontal particle 
velocity is positively correlated with pipeline damage ratio 
[23]. Thus, the damage ratio can be assumed to grow linearly 
as the intensity of seismic stress increases. Normally the gas 
flow within a pipeline can be classified as,  
𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑃 +  𝑄 =  0                                  (2) 
Where G is the admittance matrix of gas pipes, A is the 
connection matrix of the system, P is the pressure matrix of 
gas system node, and 𝑄 is flow rate vector of nodes.  
However, to model the gas pipeline leakage, a general 
hydraulic method would require many unknown variables to 
quantify the leakage loss, for instance, the pressure drop, 
outlet flow and inlet pressure. Even if the inlet pressure is 
assumed to be constant, there would still be an unduly number 
of unknown variables [24]. Thus, instead of classifying 
pressure variation due to seismic damage, this paper 
maintains the leakage loss by investigating the equivalent 
orifice diameter (EOD) of damaged pipes. A leak damage 
expectation based on EOD analysis would be specified 
regarding the probability of various leakage scenarios. 
For standard buried pipelines, seismic stress mainly 
causes five types of damage: annular disengagement, round 
crack, longitudinal crack, local crack of the pipe wall and 
local tear of the pipe wall. The EOD of damaged pipe 
regarding different scenarios can be derived as [25], 
𝑑1 = 2√𝑡𝑘𝐷                                    (3) 
𝑑2 = 2√𝜃𝐷                                     (4) 
𝑑3 = 2√𝐿𝐷𝜃/𝜋                                 (5) 
𝑑4 = 2√𝑘1𝑘2𝐷                                  (6) 
𝑑5 = 2√𝑘𝑤𝐷                                   (7) 
Where 𝑑1 , 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 , 𝑑4 , 𝑑5  are the EOD for these five 
scenarios respectively, D is the diameter of the damaged pipe, 
𝜃 is the opening angle, L is the length of the crack and can be 
taken as the length, w is the width of split and 𝑡, 𝑘, 𝑘1𝑘2 are 
constant that set as 10~16 mm, 1% and 5% respectively. 
Because the opening angle 𝜃 and width of split w are largely 
determined by pipeline material, their values are set to 0.1° 
and 12 mm from observations.  
The probabilities of that 5 damage scenarios regarding 
different pipe materials are shown in table 2. For each type of 
pipe, the possible damage scenarios are listed with its 
probability. Subsequently, the overall expectation of EOD for 
a single pipe leak would be, 
𝐸𝑂𝐷 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛=5
𝑖=1                                 (8) 
Where 𝑃𝑖  refers to the probability of different leak 
scenarios, 𝑑𝑖 is EOD under the five damage scenarios. 
 
TABLE Ⅱ 
 THE PROBABILITY OF LEAK SCENARIOS FOR PIPELINES OF 
VARIOUS MATERIALS [25] 
Pipe 
Material 
Annular 
disenga
gement 
round 
crack 
longitu
dinal 
crack 
Local 
loss of 
pipe 
wall 
Local 
tear of 
pipe 
wall 
Cast Iron 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 N/A 
Ductile 
Iron 
0.8 N/A 0.1 0.1 N/A 
Riveted 
Steel 
0.6 N/A 0.3 0.1 N/A 
Welded   
Steel 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.0 
Joint 
Concrete 
1.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Hence, a specific relationship is established between the 
seismic intensity and general natural gas loss. When the 
diameter and material of pipelines are classified, the gas 
leakage can be obtained accordingly.  
C. The coupling of electricity and gas system 
In this paper, the electricity system and gas network is 
integrated by a single transportation pathway. A Combined 
Heat and Power plant (CHP) is assumed to be installed in the 
gas network to convert gas to electricity at node C, and its 
efficiency would be 𝑃𝐺𝐶𝐻𝑃, the power output of CHP, over 
𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑠, the gas energy input of CHP. 
𝑦 =
𝑃𝐺𝐶𝐻𝑃
𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑠
                                       (9) 
Ⅲ. SEISMIC RESPONSE OF ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
This section designs a seismic loss estimation 
methodology for electricity systems, which mainly considers 
the seismic damage to lines. A probabilistic model of loss 
expectation regarding each level of seismic arrack is 
proposed. Then, the system performance quantification 
schemes are developed.  
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A.  Connection Loss   
Although the seismic behaviour of various types of 
electricity infrastructures have been assessed, a scheme that 
quantifies the performance of overall systems is desirable to 
address the power flow change within the entire system. For 
electricity systems, seismic events mainly affect its 
functionality by damaging components such as generation 
plant, substation and distribution circuits. This scheme 
mainly considers the seismic damage on distribution branches, 
as it’s the key feature to establish reliable energy supply and 
satisfy customer demand. generally, seismic events disturb 
distribution branches by shaking pylons and destroying 
conductors, and thus the connection cables can be considered 
as the most vulnerable targets of the transmission system that 
faces seismic threats. 
 
Fig. 1.  Fragility curve of transmission lines 
As shown in figure 1, paper [14] provides a probability 
model of the electricity system under earthquake attacks. 
Based on statistical analysis, this scheme concludes the 
seismic impact on distribution branches into four damage 
stages: minor damage 𝑑1, moderate damage 𝑑2, extensive 
damage 𝑑3, and the complete destruction 𝑑4. Consequently, 
for a given level of ground acceleration, these curves in 
Figure 1 describe the probability of reaching or exceeding 
each damage state. For distribution branch, each damage state 
refers to a certain level of connection loss. 𝑑1 refers to 4% 
connection loss (CL), 𝑑2 refers to 12% CL while 𝑑3, 𝑑4 
represents for 50% CL, 80% CL respectively. Subsequently, 
for the same PGA, more severe damage states correspond to 
the lower probability of occurrence [1].  
 
TABLE Ⅲ 
DAMAGE ALGORITHM FOR THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
Damage 
state 
Median(g) β 
slight/minor 0.28 0.30 
moderate 0.40 0.20 
extensive 0.72 0.15 
complete 1.10 0.15 
 
Although each level of seismic stress is related to a certain 
distribution of damage states, a damage expectation is 
necessary to obtain a certain percentage of transmission loss 
due to seismic events.  
B.  Damage Expectation of connection loss of electricity 
systems  
TABLE Ⅳ 
SEISMIC DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
Damage 
state  
Loss estimation  
Connection loss 
(CL)  
Probability  
Slight  4%  𝑃1  
Moderate  12%  𝑃2  
Extensive  50%  𝑃3  
Complete  80%  𝑃4  
 
To establish the overall CL for a certain level of PGA, the 
damage expectation should be determined. However, the four 
damage states are not completely independent. Because a 
more severe damage state contains lower damage stages, the 
damage expectation 𝐷 𝐶𝐿can be characterised as,  
𝐷 𝐶𝐿 = 𝑃𝑛𝐶𝐿𝑛 + ∑ (𝑃𝐶𝐿,𝑖−1 − 𝑃𝐶𝐿,𝑖)𝐶𝐿𝑖−1
𝑛−1
𝑖=2              (10)  
Where i∈ [15 … , 𝑛] refers to four damage states.   
Thus, if the magnitude of PGA is specified, the failure rate 
of branches within the entire system can be obtained properly.  
C.  Load Loss Estimation 
Due to seismic stress, line failures would significantly 
affect energy system security, especially the problem of 
unbalanced energy generation and demand. Referred to 
unsatisfied load demand, necessary load curtailment should 
be considered.  
Thus, this scheme mainly considers load curtailment in 
two aspects: Firstly, the decrease of generators’ capacity 
caused by gas leakage and isolated power plants would lead 
to unsatisfied load demand. Secondly, when a line failure 
occurs, other lines would be overloaded due to increasing 
power flow. Thus, proper load curtailment is conducted to 
relieve the overloading. This paper curtails load that cannot 
be satisfied based on each demand sensitivity factor to a 
system component. The demand sensitivity factor can be 
classified as, 
                                  𝑆𝐹𝑛 =
∆𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖
∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
                               (11)         
Where ∆𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ i is the power flow fluctuation along the 
branch i while ∆𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 represents for the amount of the 
curtailed load. 
D. The implementation process 
The overall implementing steps of this seismic damage 
assessment scheme for integrated electricity and gas system 
is illustrated in figure 3. For a given level of seismic events, 
the PGA and PGV are explicit values, and subsequently, the 
leakage rate and the number of failure branches can be 
obtained. The locations of gas leakage and failure electricity 
branches are randomly selected. The integrated power flow 
within the entire network is then conducted to determine load 
curtailment. Due to the overloading transmission lines and 
limited generation capacity, proper load curtailment 
strategies should be employed related to a certain intensity of 
seismic activities. Furthermore, a resilience enhancement 
strategy for system branches would be proposed based on the 
analysis of loss load due to transmission lines’ outage. 
Subsequently, the implementation steps can be specified as, 
1. Generating seismic intensity randomly 
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2. Maintaining the pipeline leakage loss and connection 
loss within the natural gas network and electricity 
system respectively. 
3. Classify reduced generation capacity including both 
CHP output and power plant. 
4. Determine the load curtailment due to decreased 
generation capacity and overloading transmission line. 
5. Relating the amount of load curtailment to the intensity 
of generating seismic activity. 
6. The vulnerability assessment of transmission lines. 
 
Investigate the 
seismic damage to 
electricity 
transmission 
system
Set seismic 
intensity
Investigate the 
pipeline leak owing to 
seismic stress
Estimate seismic damage 
to system components
The overall loss 
owing to seismic 
damage
Investigate the size of 
damage holes
Investigate the 
damage points of 
pipelines
Electricity load loss 
owing to reducing 
generation capability 
and overloading 
transmission lines
Gas leakage 
loss
 
Fig.  2.  Implementing steps of seismic damage. 
Ⅳ. CASE STUDY 
A.  The test system  
In this section, a combined 6 nodes gas network and IEEE 
30 busbars electricity network is used for demonstrating the 
developed model. As shown in figure 3, the gas network 
contains the main gas supply, 4 demand nodes and 7 pipelines. 
A gas-fired CHP C is located at node C of the gas network 
and then connected to busbar 2. The efficiency of gas-fired 
generation deployed at busbar 2 is set to 80%. 
The Monte Carlo simulation is conducted 10000 iterations 
to simulate the performance of the integrated system under 
seismic damage, regarding the randomly generated intensity 
of seismic activity. During each iteration 1) for the gas 
network, the pipe leakage is generated, randomly at the pipes 
in the system, and thus the generation of this gas supply can 
be determined. 2) For the electricity system, the expected line 
loss ratio can be calculated by equation (10) under the 
simulated seismic intensity. The lost lines are randomly 
selected from the 41 branches. Thus, the system power flow 
changes and lost loads can be accordingly quantified. 
Furthermore, the importance of each branch will be illustrated 
by a box plot figure, which compares each branches’ 
disconnecting impact within all the simulations. 
Table 5 shows the original demand of system electricity 
bus bars, the overall original load would be classified as 189.2 
MW. Loss load assessment would then be distinguished and 
investigated in the following analysis.  
 
Fig.  3.  The test system 
As for the gas network, its demand nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5 are 
set with maximum gas flow mode (generating as much as the 
substation can to satisfy those load demand), in which their 
gas demand (50, 100, 150 and 100 MW) would be satisfied at 
any time. The gas supply obtains a fixed capacity that equals 
to 600 MW. Subsequently, to minimise the decline of gas 
transferred to electricity, the CHP at node C, which has 200 
MW original demand, is operated under Max pressure mode. 
 
TABLE Ⅴ 
ORIGINAL LOAD DEMAND 
Bus No  Demand 
(MW)  
Bus  No  Demand 
(MW)  
2  21.7  17  9  
3  2.4  18  3.2  
4  7.6  19  9.5  
7  22.8  20  2.2  
8  30  21  17.5  
10  5.8  23  3.2  
12  11.2  24  8.7  
14  6.2  26  3.5  
15  8.2  29  2.4  
16  
  
3.5 
  
30  10.6  
  Total  189.2  
B.  Result analysis  
In this section, the sampled seismic intensity is set to Ⅷ, 
thus PGA is 0.45g (45%g) and PGV is 60 cm/s. Considering 
equation (10), since each PGA can be related to a certain 
probability of several damage states, the damage expectation 
of CL is then classified as 12.5% of 41 branches (5.125), 
which indicates the number of failed transmission lines is 5. 
Hence, 5 failure lines are randomly selected from 41 branches. 
In addition, another variable that is affected by seismic 
damage is the generation of CHP output. For the seismic 
intensity of 60 cm/s, the damage rate among the gas network 
is determined as 0.00003. If the overall length of gas pipes is 
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3.5 km, there will be 1 damage point. The locations of gas 
leaks are randomly generated among all gas pipelines. 
Assume all pipes within the gas network are constructed by 
Ductile Iron, based on the probabilities of that 5 damage 
scenarios, the damage expectation of EOD can then be 
estimated as 5cm. Subsequently, system leakage loss due to 
seismic damage is maintained based on Pipeline Studio, a 
pipeline analysis software that can model a wide range of 
steady-state and transient analysis of pipe systems. Based on 
the Benedict-Webb-Rubin equation, the hydraulic analysis 
function of natural gas and the liquid pipeline is employed. 
 
TABLE Ⅵ   
OUTFLOW OF GAS NETWORK DUE TO SEISMIC DAMAGE 
Components Mode of control Pressure 
(BARG) 
Flow (MW) 
CHP6 Max pressure 110 62.3~69.8 
Gas demand2 Max flow 109.3 50 
Gas demand3 Max flow 109.4 100 
Gas demand4 Max flow 109 150 
Gas demand5 Max flow 109.9 100 
Leak Leak sim 109.1 130.2~137.5 
Supply7 Max flow 109.4 600 
 
As shown in Table 6, the gas leakage varies from 130.2 
MW to 137.5 MW, consequently, the energy transferred from 
gas to electricity would be 49.84~55.84 MW. Since the 
busbar 2 within the electricity system maintains a 12 MW’s 
capability, the overall generation in busbar 2 would be 
61.84~67.84 MW. For instance, the upper left figure 
converges in the area with the highest density, which is 
between -20~0 MW, and this interval can be seen as the effect 
of 0.45g seismic activity.  However, the results indicate that 
owing to the seismic activities, the power flow carried by 
system branches can maintain an extreme value that may 
reach the limit of its capacity. Thus, the main reasons for the 
extreme value are: i) Although only 5 transmission lines have 
failures, most remaining branches are not effective enough to 
satisfy load demand: ii) Some branches could obtain more 
power flow when the directions of power flows on other 
branches reverse.  
 
Fig. 4.  The non-zero demand change for bus 21 
 
Thus, the conclusion is that some of the system branches 
could be required to satisfy more demand when seismic 
damage occurs. Subsequently, when this condition happens, 
overloading transmission lines would be generated, and the 
necessary load curtailment scheme should be applied to meet 
the transmission lines’ capacity limit. 
A sample demand change that related to overloading 
transmission lines and the shortage of generation capacity is 
illustrated in figure 4. This figure illustrates the PDF of the 
quantity of none zero load curtailment (changeless conditions 
removed) on bus 21 in 10000-time simulation, in which x axis 
refers to the amount of its demand change while y axis is the 
probability density among 10000-time simulation. When 
proper load curtailment is employed, the power demand 
curtailment on bus 21 can be generally assessed as higher than 
16 MW, which is nearly 100% of its overall demand. The 
relatively high probability for bus 21 to completely lose its 
demand (17.5 MW) indicates the high possibilities for its load 
gets completely curtailed owing to seismic activities. 
 
Fig. 5.  The non-zero demand change for bus 24 
 
Same as figure 4, figure 5 shows the overall non-zero 
demand change (changeless conditions removed) for bus 24. 
As the result illustrates, load curtailment between 8~9 MW 
maintains a higher occurrence. Although the most likely 
demand curtailment for bus 24 is 8.9 MW, its demand 
curtailment lower than 1 MW has a high probability as well. 
The reason for that case can be there is a high probability for 
bus 24 gets completely isolated from the main grid while line 
failures may only obtain a minor impact on it. 
 
Fig.  6.  The lost load for the whole system under seismic intensity Ⅷ 
 
To conclude the seismic impact on the integrated 
electricity and gas system, the lost load is assessed by 
summarising load curtailment. As shown by figure 6, for 
seismic activities that maintain Ⅷ intensity, the expectation 
interval of load curtailment would be 46.25~48.73 MW, 
which indicates that there would be the highest possibility for 
this system to have load curtailment of 46.25~ 48.73 MW.  
Figure 6 also illustrates that, since there is also a high 
probability for a zero load curtailment condition, the 
probability for this integrated system to maintain its full 
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functionality is relatively high. The states that represent the 
loss load between 10 and 20 MW have a relatively high 
chance, which may relate to the contribution of the isolated 
load. When load isolation occurs, the load would be 
considered as completely lost. Nevertheless, this condition 
may occur more frequently than predicted, and in that case, 
the quantity of loss load would vary from 3.2 MW to 30 MW, 
which leads to a downward trend between 0~30 MW. There 
is another peak of 100~180 MW, and in that case, the majority 
of system load get curtailed, this system will be divided into 
several islanded networks. Because this paper mainly refers 
to the distribution circuit, the islanded networks would be 
seen as completely lost. Moreover, regarding the whole 
system, the most possible load curtailment due to isolated 
networks would be around 140 MW. 
 
 
Since 5 branches are disconnected in each simulation, the 
load curtailment related to each branch disconnection can be 
identified. Figure 7 is a box plot that compares load 
curtailment for every faulty transmission line. Red marks 
represent average values while black lines describe the 
median values. The outliers have been removed. It can be 
observed that branches 28, 29, 30 and 36 contribute to the 
highest load curtailment far larger than other. Consequently, 
branches 28, 29, 30 and 36 can be seen as the most vulnerable 
transmission lines in this system. Besides, for most remaining 
transmission lines, the median of their load curtailment 
obtains similar values, which indicates that these branches 
may have a similar contribution to system security. 
 
Fig.  8.  System lost load under the seismic intensity of VI 
 
When seismic intensity is set to Ⅶ (0.30g), the CL would 
be 50%×4%+25%×12%=5% of 41 branches. This indicates 
that the failure of 2 lines would be generated by a seismic 
attack. Regarding the gas network, since PGV is between 16-
31 cm/s, the damage points of pipelines would be less than 1. 
Consequently, the gas pipeline network is assumed to have 
no damage. Fig. 8 shows the electricity load loss under Ⅶ 
seismic stress, where the results can be divided into two 
categories: 1) minor loss case from 0-50 MW, 2) severe loss 
load case from 145-155MW. In the minor case, the most 
likely expectation interval is between 7.63-9.98 MW while 
for the severe case, the most likely expectation interval is 
between 152.34-155.01MW.  
C.  Multi connection case  
Since the previous test system integrates the electricity 
and gas system only by a single connection, this section 
provides a more realistic test case with more interconnections. 
As shown in figure 9, three CHPs are installed at the Gas 
nodes 2, 6, 3 to convert energy from gas to electricity, 
subsequently, they are operated under Max pressure mode. 
 
 
Fig.  9.  The test system with Multi internal connections 
 
For seismic stress with intensity Ⅷ, the overall loss load 
is shown in figure 10. The confident interval of load 
curtailment is classified as 68.52~71.03 MW. Thus, the most 
possible load loss for this system can be seen as between 
68.52~71.03 MW. Comparing to the test system with a single 
interconnection, this system seems more vulnerable to 
seismic stress. The reason for that is probably that more 
interconnections between the two systems allow a more 
severe mutual effect under seismic stress. 
Similar to figure 8, Figure 11 indicates that the most 
vulnerable branches are branch 16, 28-33 and 36. Those 
branches near to interconnections between the electricity and 
gas system are extremely vulnerable (such as branch 16, 36). 
Comparing to the result of a single connection case, more 
branches behave vulnerably to seismic stress and the 
estimated overall load loss is much higher. This may indicate 
that more interconnections between electricity and gas system 
may lead to higher vulnerability. 
Fig. 7. The loss load due to branch outage 
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Fig.  10.  The lost load for the whole system 
 
Fig.  11.  The lost load due to branch outage 
 
A brief case study on substations is added here. By 
assuming the distance between seismic epicentre and 
different substations are all the same, then all the substations 
would experience a PGA of 0.45g. After 10000 times of 
Monte Carlo simulation, the PDF of load loss is given in 
figure 12. The results can be categorised into two kinds: 1) 
minor loss case from 0-60 MW, 2) severe loss load case from 
140-180MW. In the minor case, the most likely expectation 
interval is between 25.38-27.93 MW and for the severe case, 
the most likely expectation interval is between 167.93-
171.43MW. 
 
 
Fig.  12.  The lost load due to substation damage 
V. DISCUSSION ON SUBSTATIONS AND POWER PLANTS  
As there are so many types of substations, over-ground, 
pole mounted and underground, they should be differentiated 
modelled in examining seismic attacks. For a generic 
substation, the state-of-art research takes transformers and 
bushings as the most critical elements. Finite-element 
analyses indicate that the interaction between these two 
critical elements has a significant effect on seismic 
vulnerability of substations [1, 2]. Thus, there are three steps 
to assess substation vulnerability under seismic stress. Firstly, 
the vulnerability of transformers and bushings within 
different types of substation can be investigated. Then, 
substations are modelled as branches but with different 
fragility curves compared to real branches. Finally, the 
position of seismic epicentre and its PGA logarithmic 
attenuation is considered regarding substation locations. 
Divided into four different damage states by HAZUS MR4, 
the fragility curve of High Voltage substations raises rapidly 
with rising PGA. 
  
 
Fig.  13.  The fragility curves for high voltage substations [14] 
 
Similar to substations, there are many types of power 
plants with completely different physical features. Traditional 
generation plants, such as coal and natural gas, they are big 
in geographical size with numerous components, cooling 
tower, turbine, generators, and structural constructions. 
Hydropower plants are built within dams, which are normally 
very resilient to seismic attacks. For renewable generation, 
such as wind farms and solar farms, their features are 
different from the traditional generation. Wind farms are 
vulnerable to seismic attacks, as wind turbines can be 
analogue to pylons. However, considering the completely 
different physical features, there is no one general method 
that can be applied to all of them. Expensive research should 
be conducted into each type of with reliable data.  
Ⅵ.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a statistic model of seismic activity is 
developed and applied to integrated electricity and natural gas 
systems. It considers the impact of seismic events on both 
electricity transmission line and gas pipes, quantified in terms 
of load loss. the key findings are:  
• The damage caused by seismic attacks can cause certain 
load loss of the integrated electricity and gas system. Thus, 
system security can be enhanced by applying proper 
strengthen strategies. 
• For short pipelines in gas networks, seismic intensity 
lower than Ⅶ may not cause direct load loss but with 
increasing length, the consequence would become severe. 
• For systems with more interconnections between 
electricity and gas, severer load loss is caused by Ⅷ level 
seismic events, which indicates more interconnections 
may lead to higher vulnerability. It is due to due to the 
cascading impact of failures. 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 190
D
en
si
ty
Load Loss (MW)
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF BATH. Downloaded on September 25,2020 at 22:25:09 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
0885-8977 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TPWRD.2020.3017050, IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery
9 
 
This paper mainly focuses on the fragility of transmission 
lines, but the framework can be easily applied to other 
network assets, such as substations, which will be further 
explored in our future research. This research can help system 
operators to assess the performance of their integrated energy 
systems under seismic attacks and thus they can deploy 
proper branch strengthening schemes and measures to 
enhance the system resilience. 
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